Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart v. Sundance
Partners, LTD; Sundance Holdings, LLC;
Sundance Development Corp; Robert Redford;
Redford 1970 Trust; Rock Mountain Outfitters,
L.C. and Does I-X : Amicus Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
H. Burt Ringwood; A. Joseph Sano; Strong & Hanni; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Robert D. Strieper; Strieper Law Firm; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants Peter W. Summerill; Ryan
M Springer; Utah Association for Justice; Attorneys for Amicus Curiae.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Siegwart v. Sundance Partners, No. 20100331 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2297

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LISA PENUNURI and BARRY
SIEGWART,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
UTAH ASSOCIATION FOR
JUSTICE

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Supreme Court Case No.
20110565

vs.

SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD;
SUNDANCE HOLDINGS, LLC;
SUNDANCE DEVELOPMENT CORP;
ROBERT REDFORD; REDFORD
1970 TRUST; ROCK MOUNTAIN
OUTFITTERS, L.C.; and Does I-X.

Court of Appeals Case No.
20100331
District Court Case No.
08040019

Defendants /Appellees.

ON CERTIORARI FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
H. Burt Ringwood (5787)
A. Joseph Sano (9925)

Peter W. Summerill (8282)
Ryan M. Springer (9942)

STRONG & HANNI

UTAH ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City,Utah 84180
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Robert D. Strieper (10145)
STRIEPER LAW FIRM

1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

"'¥
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JAN 1 9 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LISA PENUNURI and BARRY
SIEGWART,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
UTAH ASSOCIATION FOR
JUSTICE

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Supreme Court Case No.
20110565

vs.

SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD;
SUNDANCE HOLDINGS, LLC;
SUNDANCE DEVELOPMENT CORP;
ROBERT REDFORD; REDFORD
1970 TRUST; ROCK MOUNTAIN
OUTFITTERS, L.C.; and Does I-X.

Court of Appeals Case No.
20100331
District Court Case No.
08040019

Defendants /Appellees.

ON CERTIORARI FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

H. Burt Ringwood (5787)
A. Joseph Sano (9925)

Peter W. Summerill (8282)
Ryan M. Springer (9942)

STRONG & HANNI

UTAH ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City,Utah 84180
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Robert D. Strieper (10145)
STRIEPER LAW FIRM

1371 East 2100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, (Utah 1990)

9

Am. Bush v. City ofS. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235

7

Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323

12

Beasleyv. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 191 U.S. 492 (1903)

vi

Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003)
Berry v. Greater Park City, Co., 2007 UT 87, 171 P.3d442

...25
passim

Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22 (1904)

7

Burton v. Exam. Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261

3

Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989)

6, 13

DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995)

13

Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840 (1949)

17

Grundbergv. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991)
Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 885 A.2d 734 (2005)
Hansen v. America Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, 96 P.3d 950

6
viii
3

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, (Utah 1993)

13

Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, 37 P.3d 442

21

Hurdv. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)

4

In re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, 82 P.3d 1134

8

Interest Const, v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, (Utah 1996)
Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
8

Mettler ex rel. Burnett v. Nellis, 695 N.W.2d 861 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005)

18

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, (1963)
Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51

9
17

Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, 179 P.3d 760

15, 20, 21, 23

Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366

9

Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 2001 UT 32, 23 P.3d 1022

3

Reardonv. Windswept Farm, LLC, 905 A.2d 1156 (Conn. 2006)

27

Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Wis. 1994)

18

Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, 175 P.3d 560

1, 2, 22

S.H. ex rel. R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363(Utah 1993)

6, 13

Snow v. Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 2007 UT 63, 167 P.3d 1051
3
State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106
Tunklv. Regents of Univ. ofCal, 383 P.2d441 (Cal. 1963)..

7
passim

U.S.v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (187'5)

9

United States v. Miles, 2 Utah 19, (Terr. 1877)

1

Woodv. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, 67 P.3d 436

6

Zamorav. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, (Utah 1981)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

12

'

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING

v

STANDARD OF REVIEW, STATEMENT OF THE CASE, AND ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL

v

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

v

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

vi

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

vi

ARGUMENT

1

I. PUBLIC POLICY IS A LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY TOOL FOR
EVALUATING PREINJURY RELEASES

1

II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ENSHRINES THE PUBLIC POLICY INTEREST
IN DETERRING WRONGFUL CONDUCT BY PRESERVING TORT LIABILITY. 6
A. The Petition Clause Preserves Public Policy Interest in Deterring Wrongful
Conduct
B. The Open Courts Clause Reinforces Utah's Policy Interest in Public
Adjudication of Private Disputes to Deter Further Wrongful Conduct
III.

TORT LAW PROMOTES THE PUBLIC GOOD

7

11
13

IV. OVERLY BROAD RELEASES THAT IMMUNIZE AGAINST HARM "FOR
ANY REASON" VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY
18
V. THE EQUINE LIABILITY ACT PRESERVES NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
AGAINST ACTIVITY SPONSORS

20

CONCLUSION

28

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

29

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

30

ADDENDUM A

31

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Statutes
Connecticut Statute § 52-557p

28

N.M. St. § 42-13-4

26

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2.

.11

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201

4

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202

vi, 22,24

Other Authorities
1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION (Salt Lake
City, Star Printing Co. 1898)
10
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

(8th ed. 2004)

CDC Data & Statistics | Feature: Nonfatal Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBIs)

9
25

J. Thomas Greene, Reflections of a Senior Judge, 232 F.R.D. 425 (October 14, 2005).. 12
NCBI: Medical Non-fatal horse related injuries treated in emergency departments in the
United States, 2001-2003
25

Oliver W.Holmes, THE COMMON LAW (1881)
Steve Russell, Pre-Injury Releases: A Problem Easily Solved, UTAH TRIAL J. 7, 10
(Winter/Spring 2010)
."

6
17

W. Page Keeton et al, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE: LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).... 15
Constitutional Provisions
Utah Const. Art. I, § 1

8

Utah Const. Art. I, § 11

13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING
This Court granted permission for Amicus briefing on December 20, 2011.

STANDARD OF REVIEW, STATEMENT OF THE CASE, AND ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL
As amicus curiae, the Utah Association for Justice refers to the Standard of
Review, Statement of the Case, and Issues Presented on Appeal as set forth by
Appellants, and incorporates them as if set forth fully herein.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Utah Association for Justice ("UAJ") is a statewide organization comprised
of attorneys committed to protecting the rights of persons who have been injured in their

(

person or property, and who turn to the courts for judicial redress. In promoting these
interests, UAJ seeks to preserve a fair, prompt, open and efficient administration of
i

justice.
UAJ members represent injured people in the vast majority of personal injury tort
actions in this state. The Court's decision on whether or not pre-injury releases are valid

<

and its consideration of Utah public policy will impact virtually every one of those
actions, as well as future personal injury litigation. Thus, the resolution of this case
significantly impacts the parties to this action, as well as thousands of tort victims
throughout the State of Utah as well.
<
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const. Art, i § 1:
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the
abuse of that right.
Utah Const. Art. L § 11:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
"[T]he very meaning of public policy is the interest of others than the parties, and that
interest is not to be at the mercy of the defendant alone."1
Imagine a new recreational activity that has become the latest craze, it is called
"Hangman"—as part of an "old west" recreational facility, thrill seeking participants can
be "hanged" as a criminal or horse thief. The gallows fully emulates a real life gallows,
so that participants can have the complete experience, right down to falling through a trap
door with a noose around their neck. The gallows, of course, is rigged so that the
participant lands on a soft pad just prior to the time the rope runs out of length. The
activity catches on as a new "near death" extreme sport, and thousands of adrenaline

1

Beasley v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 191 U.S. 492, 498 (1903) (Holmes, O.W.).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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junkie thrill seekers start participating in the activity. The participants all know the
inherent risks such as rope burn, or splinters from the wooden deck.
In order to keep the business profitable and reduce expensive premiums associated
with liability insurance, the business owners require that all participants sign a preinjury,
exculpatory agreement. Specifically, the owners immunize themselves against any and all
claims for injury, damages or loss as a result of negligence by the owner, their agents or
employees. One day, because he is not paying attention, a minimum wage operator at the
Hangman activity is checking his text messages as he winds out a new noose for the
day's activity. He mistakenly shortens the noose by six inches. And, on this one fateful
day, a middle aged father of three is rendered a quadriplegic. The father loses his job, and
eventually his health insurance. He applies for and receives social security disability. He
applies for and receives state Medicaid benefits. His wife, always a homemaker and
mom, takes a minimum wage job. But, with three children, the family can't make ends
meet and are forced to further apply for and rely upon state aid.
Approving exculpatory contracts implicitly condones as 'good' public policy the
shifting of costs and consequences of a business' own negligence back onto the public at
large. However, if an activity is so riddled with danger that it cannot profitably obtain
insurance, the better policy is to not subsidize that dangerous activity through the shifting
of private costs to the public.
The legislature, in the case of equine activities, i.e., horseback riding, expressly
preserved liability for negligence not once or twice, but three times within the Equine
Liability Act. Owners remain liable for equipment failure "due to the sponsor's or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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professional's negligence."2 Operators also remain liable if they fail to "make reasonable
efforts to determine whether the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent
with the activity with the participant."0 In addition to the specifically enumerated duties,
the Equine Act also retains liability for commits an act or omission that constitutes
negligence."4 The legislative voice speaks against ill-advised attempts to shift
consequences of horse owner's negligence back upon the public at large.
Additionally, public policy further weighs against the enforcement of preinjury
releases. Utah has endorsed "the prevailing view that the law disfavors preinjury
exculpatory agreements."5 Nevertheless, this Court has acknowledged that, "despite its
flaws," the "general principle that preinjury releases are enforceable" is a part of Utah's
common law, though it is subject to certain exceptions.6 One of those exceptions is
where the preinjury release violates public policy.
This case asks the Court to consider whether public policy invalidates a preinjury
exculpatory agreement that Appellants required Appellee to sign prior to participating in
recreational horseback riding activities. Amicus curiae Utah Association for Justice
asserts that Utah has a strong policy interest in promoting safe recreational opportunities

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202(2)(a)(iii) (West 2012).
Id. at (2)(b) (emphasis added).

4

Id. at 2(d)(1).

5

Berry v. Greater Park City, Co., 2007 UT 87, 1 14, 171 P.3d 442 (citing Hanks v.
Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 885 A.2d 734, 739 (2005)).
6

See id. at 1113-14.
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accessible to its citizens. Utah being billed as a recreational destination, sponsors of such
activities are engaged in public services, and ought to act with reasonable care.
Preinjury exculpatory releases for recreational horseback riding activities are
contrary to public policy inasmuch as they remove the deterrent force of tort liability for
ordinary negligence. Given the nature of public recreation in the state for residents and
non-residents alike, Utah also has strong policy interests given the nature of the activity
at issue, recreational horseback riding, the preinjury exculpatory agreement in this case is
contrary to Utah's public policy of promoting public safety and deterring wrongful
conduct by preserving tort remedies for ordinary negligence. The UAJ requests that the
Court reverse the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals, and reaffirm Utah's public policy
in favor of promoting public safety and deterring wrongful conduct through preserving
tort liability.

<

i
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i

ARGUMENT
I.

PUBLIC POLICY IS A LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY TOOL
FOR EVALUATING PREINJURY RELEASES.

Utah courts have relied on public policy in crafting the common law since prior to
statehood. The first use of public policy by a Utah court appears to have occurred in
1877, when the territorial court declared, "Concealment of the marriage contract is
contrary to public policy and injurious to the best interests of society." More recently, in
o

Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., this Court identified public policy as a basis for holding
preinjury releases unenforceable:
Preinjury releases from liability for one's negligence pit two bedrock legal
concepts against one another: the right to order one's relationship with
another by contract and the obligation to answer in damages when one
injures another by breaching a duty of care. We have joined the majority of
jurisdictions in permitting people to surrender their rights to recover in tort
for the negligence of others. We have made it clear throughout our
preinjury release jurisprudence, however, that contract cannot claim victory
over tort in every instance. We have indicated that releases that are not
sufficiently clear and unambiguous cannot be enforced. We have also
indicated that we would refuse to enforce releases that offend public
policy.

7

United States v. Miles, 2 Utah 19, 0-8 (Terr. 1877).

8

2007 UT 96, 175P.3d560.

9

Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, ^ 6, 175 P.3d 560 (citing Berry v.
Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, U 12, 171 P-3d 442 and Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT
94,H9,n.3,37P.3d442).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court also noted, however, that public policy is a "protean substance,"10 and
cautioned against it being relied upon as a basis for judicial determination "unless [it] is
deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions[.]"u
In Rothstein, the legislature enacted a statute that struck a bargain in the interest of
public policy: "ski area operators would be freed from liability for inherent risks of skiing
so that they could continue to shoulder responsibility for noninherent risks by purchasing
insurance."

A 3-2 majority concluded that ski area operators' extraction of preinjury

releases from skiers "breached this public policy bargain," and the releases were
therefore unenforceable.
The majority in Rothstein noted that, "[r]ead in its most restrictive sense," the
statutory policy statement "simply announces that it is the public policy of Utah to bar
skiers from recovering from recovering from ski area operators for injuries resulting from
the inherent risks of skiing, as enumerated in the [statute]."

Rather than injecting its

"[P]ublic policy is a protean substance that is too often easily shaped to satisfy
the preferences of a judge rather than the will of the people or the intentions of the
Legislature." Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, If 10, 175 P.3d 560. Although
the description may be carry a negative connotation, "protean" can also be understood as
a positive attribute. Although it can mean "tending or able to change frequently or easily:
it is difficult to comprehend the whole of this protean subject." The New Oxford
American Dictionary, 3rd Ed., Oxford University Press. It also means "able to do many
different things; versatile: Shostakovich was a remarkably protean composer, one at
home in a wide range of styles." Id.
11

Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, If 10, 175 P.3d 560.

n

Id. atlf 16.
Id.; see also id. at ^f 20.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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own public policy views, however, the majority recognized that although the statute did
not expressly invalidate preinjury releases, it nevertheless contained an implicit "public
policy bargain"15 that precluded such releases from being enforced.16 Clearly, public
policy is not only a legitimate resource, but is also a necessary tool, in determining the
enforceability of preinjury releases.
This case involves the Equine and Livestock Activities Act (the "Equine Act"),17
but it is not the sole source of public policy. Statutes are but one of three sources from
which public policy may be ascertained: "We have stated that a public policy is 'clear' if
it is plainly defined by one of three sources: (1) legislative enactments; (2) constitutional
standards; or (3) judicial decisions."

And in Hansen v. America Online, Inc.} this

Court explained:

14

MatTJ13.

15

Mat^l6.

See Snow v. Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 2007 UT 63, ^f
13, 167 P.3d 1051 ("Occasionally, the expression of state policy from our legislative
branch is not as clear and understandable as they, or we as citizens, might hope . . . .
[W]hen the policy and the intent of the legislature is unclear with respect to a particular
enactment, it is to the judicial branch of state government that we turn for clarification
. . . . This process . . . was calculated by the framers of our form of government to be
most likely to produce a correct result.").
17

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-201 et seq.

18

Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 2001 UT 32, \ 16, 23 P.3d 1022; see
also Burton v. Exam. Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, ^ 6, 994 P.2d
1261 (stating that "declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and
statutes"). See also Utah Pub. Employees Ass yn v. State, 2006 UT 9, \ 59, 131 P.3d 725
(Parrish, J., concurring) (explaining that public policy is distinct from both legislative text
and history).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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We have no need to analyze the text of [a] statute [where] the issue before
us is not one of statutory interpretation. The centerpiece of our inquiry is
the strength and scope of public policy. In our effort to assay this question,
we are not restricted to parsing statutory text and may properly look to
many sources, including legislative history, which may illuminate the
dimensions of the public policy at issue.
Public policy interests are necessary considerations for the Court to make.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "[w]here the enforcement of private
agreements would be violative of [public] policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain
.

.

9

1

from such exertions of judicial power."

.

While courts are wise to avoid "judicial

mischief," they should not do so at the expense of the legitimate goal of preserving
strong public policy. As former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Holmes wrote:
The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and always
with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices
of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is developed by
litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely

19

2004 UT 62, 96 P.3d 950.

20

Id. at f 15, n.7; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178, When A
Term Is Unenforceable On Grounds Of Public Policy (1981) ("In weighing a public
policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of: (a) the strength of that policy
as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to
enforce the term will further that policy.") (Emphasis added).
21

Hurdv. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948).

22

See id.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure, under our
practice and traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive preferences and
inarticulate convictions, but nonetheless traceable to views of public policy
in the last analysis.23
The court of appeals failed to engage in a thorough public policy analysis due to
the lack of an express legislative statement. It should not have concluded its analysis
there, however. "Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public
good."24 When "public policy" is employed as shorthand, without more explanation and
analysis, it becomes nothing more than conclusory—protean in the negative sense.
However, when well-defined and applied analytically, public policy is a legitimate,
necessary tool for evaluating the enforceability of preinjury releases.
As the state constitution and common law show, Utah has a strong public policy
interest in deterring unreasonable conduct through tort liability. As the following
sections show, the constitution contains public policy in favor of preserving tort remedies
as a means of deterring wrongful conduct and promoting public safety. These interests
weigh against the use of preinjury releases for recreational activities, and warrant
invalidation of the release.

^ Oliver W. Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1881) (emphasis added).
24

Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989)(quotation

omitted).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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II.

THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ENSHRINES THE PUBLIC POLICY
INTEREST IN DETERRING WRONGFUL CONDUCT BY
PRESERVING TORT LIABILITY.

Public safety is good public policy. While tort law serves to compensate
individual injured parties for their losses due to another's negligence, its primary purpose
is to serve the broader public interest by deterring wrongful conduct:
The association of negligence with purely compensatory damages has
prompted the erroneous impression that liability for negligence is intended
solely as a device for compensation. Its economic function is different; it is
to deter uneconomical accidents. As it happens, the right amount of
deterrence is produced by compelling negligent injurers to make good the
victim's losses.
The "traditional goals of tort law" are "deterrence and cost distribution."26 Indeed,
deterrence of wrongful conduct "is at the core of all American tort law."27 "Tort liability
has a powerful deterrent effect on future conduct and would do much to protect other[s] .
.. from being harmed under similar circumstances."

Accordingly, the framers of

Utah's Constitution sought to explicitly protect and preserve the right to seek judicial
redress. Two provisions address this issue: the Petition Clause and the Open Courts
Clause.

^ Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) (quoting R.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.12, at 143 (1972) (footnote omitted)).
26

See Grundbergv. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1991).

27

Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, \ 83, 67 P.3d 436
(Durham, C.J., dissenting).
28

See S.H. ex rel R.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. The Petition Clause Preserves Public Policy Interest in Deterring
Wrongful Conduct.
The Declaration of Rights in Utah's Constitution states, "All men have the
inherent and inalienable right... to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions,
being responsible for the abuse of that right."29 According to the Utah Supreme Court,
this provision:
[C]onstitute[s] the supreme law of the commonwealth upon this subject. To that
law, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments of the government
alike must bow obedience, as well as every subject. It forbids the abridgement by
the state of the privileges and immunities of all citizens . . . . These are inherent
and inalienable rights of citizens, and are constitutional guaranties. An enactment,
therefore, which deprives a person arbitrarily of... some part of his personal
liberty, is just as much inhibited by the supreme law as one which would deprive
him of life.30
Though there has been little discussion of the Petition Clause in Utah's appellate
courts, the plain language of the clause reveals its meaning. "Independent analysis must
begin with the constitutional text and rely on whatever assistance legitimate sources may
provide in the interpretive process."

Indeed, "[t]he interpretation of the protections

afforded by the Utah Constitution appropriately commences with a review of the
constitutional text."32

29

Utah Const. Art. I, § 1 (1896) (emphasis added).

30

Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24-25 (1904).

31

State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, t 37, 162 P.3d 1106.

32

Am. Bush v. City o/S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40,110, 140 P.3d 1235.
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A "petition" is "[a] formal written request presented to a court or other official
body . . . . In some states, a lawsuit's first pleading."33

In Kish v. Wright?* the Utah

Supreme Court recognized that "the Constitution of Utah . . . gives its citizens the
'inherent and inalienable' right to petition a state tribunal for redress of grievances in
civil actions."

Thus, under a plain meaning analysis, a petition for redress of grievances

is the same as a civil action. The right to bring a civil action is therefore considered an
"inherent and inalienable right" by the Utah Constitution.
The clause's significance is further illuminated by its history, as well as its
context. In selecting the phrasing, the framers noted that the consecutive ordering
contemplated that the rights of assembly, protest, and petition mutually served "the
purpose of communicating [the people's] thoughts." The framers also explained that
"[w]e put in our bill of rights a declaration that the right of petition of the people should
not be taken away from them."

And they declared that "one of the very first articles

that we passed in this Constitutional Convention was an article upon the declaration of

<

rights, following out of the principle laid down in Magna Charta, and the principles in our
own Declaration of Independence, that the right of petition shall never be ignored, and we
1

33

34

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1182 (8th ed. 2004).

562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977).

,

35

Id. at 627; see also In re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, \ 68, 82 P.3d 1134 ("In filing a
civil action . .. Judge Anderson exercised his right to petition for redress of grievances.").
36

1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION

229 (Salt Lake City, Star Printing Co. 1898).
31
Id. at 1182.
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have in our article on the declaration of rights declared in favor of the right of petition."38
The framers* reverence for the right of petition is not surprising; at the time Utah attained
statehood, it was already well-settled that "[t]he very idea of a government, republican in
form, implies a right on the part of its citizens . . . to petition for a redress of
grievances."
The historical record establishes that Utah's constitutional framers recognized the
petition right as an independently significant free expression right. Significantly, courts
are forums for "free and open expression."40 The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly
recognized that judicial petitions for civil redress "are modes of expression . . . protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments," and are subject to judicial protection.41 As the
Court explained, "litigation is not [just] a technique of resolving private differences; it is
a means for achieving . .. lawful objectives."42 In such circumstances, "[i]t is thus a form
of political expression."43

38

M at 1455.

39

U.S. v. CruikshanK 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).

40

See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,127, 164 P.3d 366. Pratt addressed the
judicial proceeding privilege, which is recognized as necessary to facilitate the "free and
open expression by all participants." Id. (citing Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1311
(Utah 1990)).
41

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963).

42

Id

43

Id
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The petition right's inclusion with other freedoms of expression is no mere
coincidence. The right is intrinsically associated with expression, and should be
weighted and analyzed accordingly. It goes without saying that Utah is a common law
state, and while statutes supersede the common law,44 its development is nevertheless a
critical part of state government. The common law can only be developed where disputes
are adjudicated by the courts, in a public forum; this is the essence of the expressive
nature of the petition right. If preinjury releases are enforced, there is no deterrence, and
no contribution is made to the common law. Deterring wrongful conduct and promoting
public safety are certainly "lawful objectives," and are enshrined in the state's founding
charter.
Reflecting on his fifty-year legal career, Utah Federal Judge J. Thomas Greene
mourned the erosion of traditional civil litigation.45 He noted:
[W]e should not forget that the fundamental purpose of the courts is to
litigate differences, and that citizens have a right to litigate. In this regard,
Supreme Court Justice Harlan pointed out that litigation is not a scurrilous
or evil thing, and that the right to litigate is derived from the First
Amendment guarantee of the right to petition for redress of grievances. He
said, "We have passed the point where litigation is regarded as an evil that
must be avoided if some accommodation short of a lawsuit can possibly be
worked out. Litigation is often the desirable and orderly way of obtaining
vindication of fundamental rights.

\

44

See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2.

45

J. Thomas Greene, Reflections of a Senior Judge, 232 F.R.D. 425 (October 14,

2005).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court said, "[0]ver the course of centuries, our
society has settled upon civil litigation as a means for redressing
grievances, resolving disputes, and vindicating rights . . . . That our citizens
have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be regretted; rather, it is an
attribute of our system of justice in which we ought to take pride."46
Permitting the enforcement of preinjury releases that are required preconditions to
participating in recreational activities such as horseback riding abridges the petition right
and forecloses public expression, thereby defeating the deterrent effect of tort law. The
public policy interest in petitioning for redress publicizes negligence, resulting in
deterrence and promoting public safety. If private parties are permitted to immunize
themselves from ordinary negligence claims through the use of preinjury releases, not
only is access to justice denied, but recreational activities will become less safe due to the
loss of deterrence. Enforcement of the preinjury release in this case is contrary to the
public policy inherent in the Utah Constitution's Petition Clause.
B. The Open Courts Clause Reinforces Utah's Policy Interest in Public
Adjudication of Private Disputes to Deter Further Wrongful
Conduct.
Utah's constitutional Open Courts Clause states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.47

Id. at 440-41 (emphasis in original).
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11.
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This provision guarantees access to a public judicial forum where parties can obtain
substantive redress of their grievances. It embodies a "higher principle[ ] of justice,"48
and, like the Petition Clause, reflects the framers' policy interest in preserving the civil
justice system as a means of resolving disputes and deterring wrongful conduct.
Additionally, the Open Courts Clause preserves access to a public judicial forum
wherein petitions for the redress of grievances may be heard. Certainly, the mutual
inclusion of the term "redress" in the Petition and Open Courts Clauses supports their
interrelatedness: petitions state the claims to be redressed, and courts are forums in which
such petitions are entertained. When private disputes are adjudicated in public forums,
there is a greater deterrent effect. When negligence occurs in silence, and public
consequences escaped, there is little disincentive to refrain from further unreasonable
conduct. The Open Courts Clause ensures access to a public forum where common law
can be made through the publication of private grievances.
These constitutional provisions and judicial decisions clearly establish Utah's

<

strong public policy interest in favor of preserving negligence causes of action, and weigh
against foreclosure of the right to seek judicial redress by the enforcement of preinjury
releases.49

48

See Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah 1981).

49

See Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323
(recognizing the public policy in favor of preserving "free access to the courts" and
against depriving "the individual a fair opportunity to present his or her claim," See id. at
T( 59 (quotations and internal citations omitted)).
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The legislature has already granted the recreational industry broad immunity for
injuries suffered as a result of the inherent risks of an activity. This enables private
parties to operate recreational businesses for a profit, amd preserves access to liability
insurance. Permitting these businesses to further immunize themselves against claims for
ordinary negligence, however, violates Utah's public policy interest in promoting public
safety by deterring negligent conduct. As discussed in the next section, this is the
essence of tort law.
III.

TORT LAW PROMOTES THE PUBLIC GOOD.

As discussed above, tort law provides not only a means to compensation50 for
people harmed by the negligence of another person's conduct, but also establishes a
sound deterrent and encourages others to act with reasonable care.51 The courts
consistently "evaluate whether the effect of tort liability would promote public safety."
"Tort liability has a powerful deterrent effect on future conduct and would do much to
CO

protect other children from being harmed under similar circumstances.'5 The public
policy in favor of tort law mitigates the flow of damages away from the tortfeasor and
50

Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 364 (Utah 1989) (in addition to
compensation, tort law is intended to "deter uneconomical accidents.")
51

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976 (Utah 1993) (Allowing
medical surveillance damages for toxic-tort plaintiffs "furthers the deterrent function of
the tort system by compelling those who expose others to toxic substances to minimize
risks and costs of exposure.").
52

53

DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995).
S.K ex rel R.K v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993).
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back onto the public at large through welfare, insurance and entitlement programs.^ In
sum, the authorities consistently validate the general good and sound public policy
supporting a system which maintains accountability of those who act with carelessness.
These principles underlying tort law are so substantial and fundamental that there can be
virtually no question as to their importance for the public good.
Importantly, the deterrent effect of negligence "belong[s] to society, not individual
parties, and societal interests should outweigh private interests [over] freedom of
contract."55 Any decision to validate a private contract which shifts burdens to the public
must be "based on prior ... judicial decisions, applying only those principles which are so
substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to their importance
for promotion of the public good."56
Appellee Sundance stands on a mistaken assumption: that this Court will never
entertain or consider public policy arguments against exculpatory contracts. Berry v.
Greater Park City Co., in fact, holds quite the opposite. "The right to contract is always
en

subordinate to the obligation to stand accountable for one's negligent acts." Being

W. Page Keeton et al, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 at 25
(5th ed. 1984) ("courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with
admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the courts become known, and
defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to
prevent the occurrence of harm.").
55

Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1105 (N.M. 2003) (refusing to
uphold exculpatory contract after injury during horseback riding activity).
56

Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989).
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subordinate; the validity of exculpatory pre-injury releases may still be called into
question. Berry stopped short of holding all preinjury releases unenforceable as a matter
of public policy. Rather, Berry recognized that the right to contract away one's right to
recover damages for the negligence of another is "subject to many conditions and
CO

limitations," including limitations of public policy.
Berry went on to note that the public policy considerations in that case merely fell
"short of convincing us that freedom to contract should always yield to the right to
recover damages on the basis of another's fault."59 Wliile pre-injury releases for damage
due to another's negligence may not 'always' yield, there may still be occasions which
warrant invalidation of the exculpatory contract as contrary to public policy.
Accordingly, there remain "exceptions to the general principle that pre injury releases are
enforceable."60 In Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., this Court confirmed that there remain
exceptions to the 'general rule' that "people may contract away their rights to recover in
tort for damages caused by the ordinary negligence of others."61

" Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,1 11, 171 P.3d 442, 445-46.
58

Seeid.^UAl.

59

Id. at Tf 11 (emphasis added).

60

Mat1Jl3.

61

Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, U 14, 179 P.3d 760, 765
(observing that public policy, public interest and ambiguity all remain valid objections to
enforcement of an exculpatory contract).
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Berry acknowledged the "legal and social philosophy" favoring invalidation of
preinjury releases. But, another public policy not yet considered by Utah courts also
favors invalidation. As one commentator has explained:
What legal, equitable, or public policy justification exists to allow for-profit
businesses to require their customers to contractually waive liability for
their own negligence? This question is especially important when one
considers that business owners and service providers can easily protect
themselves with liability insurance and pass the cost of that protection on to
their customers.
In fact, in all but the least responsible businesses (and therefore the most
likely to injure or kill someone) they do have insurance. . . . Thus,
perversely, the law as it presently exists is detrimental to the legitimate
interests of consumers and serves only to protect the coffers of business
insurers whose policy holders are required to carry coverage but obliged to
deny it.62
The public policy principles underlying tort law are so substantial and
fundamental that there is no good reason to question their importance for the public good.
Thus, when parties seek to exculpate themselves from the consequences of their own
negligence, and ultimately force those costs back upon the public at large, courts should
reject that request as antithetical to public good unless a countervailing public good can
be gained. Here, the ability to arrange one's affairs as one sees fit must yield to the
overall public good achieved through the deterrent and compensatory effects of
remaining accountable and liable for harm caused by one's own negligence.

I
62

Steve Russell, Pre-Injury Releases: A Problem Easily Solved, UTAH TRIAL J. 7,
10 (Winter/Spring 2010) (emphasis in original).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A private, preinjury release increases profits for business, relieving them of steps
otherwise necessary to fully meet their obligations of reasonable care to society at large.
A private exculpatory contract then shifts costs and consequences of negligently
conducted business back onto the public at large through increased health care costs,
reliance on public welfare and aid programs, lost wage earning and lost services to
families.
Businesses that contract around their duty of reasonable care lower the cost of
doing business, but at the expense of the public at large. For-profit business should not be
allowed to escape their liability and shift those costs to the public at large by way of a
private contract.
Courts should not condone and encourage for-profit enterprise that entice others to
pursue risky activities under the guise of professional supervision. Allowing for-profit
businesses to immunize themselves against negligence in the very arena wherein they
hold themselves out as experts serves and promotes no societal benefits. "There can be no
doubt concerning the duty of this Court to invalidate contracts which have a tendency to
be injurious to the public welfare." More recently this Court observed that, in addition
to violation of legislatively expressed policy, contracts may also be struck down because
enforcement "harmed the public as a whole—not just an individual."64

63

Frailey v. McGarry, 116 Utah 504, 516-17, 211 P.2d 840, 847 (1949).

64

Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ^ 23, 189 P.3d 51 (citation omitted) (ultimately
upholding trust contract because it'did not harm the general public').
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If an activity is so dangerous that the recreational outfitter cannot obtain liability
insurance without also exacting an exculpatory contract immunizing them against their
own negligence, then perhaps the courts should refrain from allowing, encouraging,
supporting and promoting such dangerous businesses. In effect, upholding an exculpatory
contract disturbs the free market by subsidizing and passing on the costs of negligence to
society at large where the free market has already determined that the services provided
may not be worth their cost because insurance cannot be obtained.
IV.

OVERLY BROAD RELEASES THAT IMMUNIZE AGAINST
HARM "FOR ANY REASON" VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY.

Exculpatory contracts which release liability "for any reason" offend public
policy. In Mettler ex rel Burnett v. Nellis the court also dealt with an exculpatory
•

i

contract in a horseback riding case. The pre-injury release immunized against "any
liability or responsibility for any accident damage, injury or illness and was "broad
enough to include intentional behavior."65 The court held that "an exculpatory contract

{

contravenes public policy when it would absolve the tortfeasor from any injury to the
victim for any reason."66 An exculpatory agreement will generally be held to contravene
public policy if it is so broad "that it would absolve [the defendant] from any injury to the
[plaintiff] for any reason."
i

65

Mettler ex rel. Burnett v. Nellis, 695 N.W.2d 861. 865 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005).

66

Id.

67

Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Wis. 1994).

I
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The release in this case is so broad that it also offends notions of public good:
Paragraph 1. "I expressly agree to assume all risks of personal injury, falls,
accidents, and/or property damage, including those resulting from any
negligence of Sundance."
Paragraph 2. " . . . agree to indemnify and hold SUNDANCE harmless
from all claims, damages or injuries in any way related to my participation
in Horseback Riding . . . . " "My release includes all claims regarding the
design, maintenance . . ., products liability."
Paragraph 3. "I agree that no lawsuit will be filed by me or on my behalf
against SUNDANCE as a result of my participation in Horseback Riding,
use of any facilities or for any injuries or damages that I sustain even if
SUNDANCE was negligent."
Paragraphs 1 and 3 are so broad as to release injury for any reason whatsoever, making
the exculpatory contract so broad as to be unenforceable.
Further, Paragraph 2 is particularly offensive because it impermissibly prohibits
claims based upon products liability. Under Utah law. parties may not avoid liability for
products liability. "On grounds of public policy, parties to a contract may not generally
exempt a seller of a product from strict tort liability for physical harm to a user or
consumer unless the exemption term is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the
policy underlying that [strict tort] liability.68

05

Interwest Const v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(3) (1981)).
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Accordingly, the shear breadth and scope of the release at issue in this case has
already been found to be in violation of sound public policy principles. This case marks
an opportunity for the Court to reinforce those public policy principles by reaffirming
that such overreaching exculpatory contracts will not be tolerated.
V.

THE EQUINE LIABILITY ACT PRESERVES NEGLIGENCE
CLAIMS AGAINST ACTIVITY SPONSORS.

In Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., the court held that "recreational activities do
not constitute a public interest and that, therefore, preinjury releases for recreational
activities cannot be invalidated under the public interest exception."69 However, in
Pearce the court did not have before it any statutory regulation which evinced or
supported a "public interest." Here, by contrast, there is an express statutorily recognized
public interest by virtue of the Equine Act. Accordingly, a blanket prohibition against
considering exculpatory clauses for recreational activities is overcome by legislation
which demonstrates the recreational activity to be a public interest worthy of regulation.
Under the Equine Liability Act, activity sponsors are "not liable for injury to or
the death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with [horseback riding]."
However, the legislature chose to preserve responsibility for negligence. Sponsors remain
liable for harm if they "provided the equipment... and an equipment failure was due to

Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, % 17, 179 P.3d 760, 766.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202(2) (West 2012).
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the sponsors negligence,

or, "failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether

the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the activity and with the
79

participant,'

7^

or, commit "an act or omission that constitutes negligence."

Sundance

attempted to avoid exactly what the statute retained - liability for negligence.
When determining whether to void an exculpatory clause, Hawkins and several
other Utah decisions cited with approval Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cat.

Tunkl

surveyed the case law at the time and arrived at a "rough outline" of the factors which
typically cause invalidation of exculpatory clauses.

In Berry v. Greater Park City Co.,

the court adopted the Tunkl factors as a means for evaluating exculpatory clauses. Here,
all but two of those factors are satisfied.
In the face of a clearly expressed public policy, Sundance's exculpatory contract
violates the first factor under a Tunkl analysis: "[The transaction] concerns a business of a

11

Id. at (2)(a)(iii).

72

M a t (3).

73

Id. at (d)(i).

74

See Hawkins at ^j 9. See also Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found., 2008 UT 13, f
17, 179 P.3d 760; and Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,1 15, 171 P.3d 442.
75

Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cat, 3 83 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1963).

Admittedly, horseback riding recreational activities are neither a "service of
great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some
members of the public", or an "essential service." See, e.g., Berry, 2007 UT 87, *[[ 10, 171
P.3d442.
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type generally thought suitable for public regulation."

Because the Equine Act

expressly retains liability for negligence or the failure to exercise reasonable care, it
espouses a public interest in favor of maintaining that liability. Private parties should not
be allowed to contract around a legislatively announced obligation to exercise reasonable
care.
Further, because the legislature chose to use the word "negligence" and the phrase
"failed to make reasonable efforts," there is no question regarding the purpose of the
statute unlike the situation in Rothstein v. Snowbird. The Rothstein majority, interpreting
the inherent risks of skiing act, had before it no express reservation of negligence within
the statutory language. Rothstein therefore looked toward the expressed public policy and
came to the inescapable conclusion that liability for negligence wras retained under the ski
act. Here, by contrast, the retention for liability of negligence is expressly made within
the Equine Act. The legislature reserved the right and ability of participants to bring
claims for negligence as well as a duty for operators to exercise reasonable care.

'

The other Tunkl factors are also present in this case. It appears that Sundance
holds itself out as willing to perform the horseback riding for hire service to any member
of the public.79 Sundance also makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay

i

77

Berry, 2007 UT 87,1 10, 171 P.3d 442.

78

Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, ^ 16, 175 P.3d 560.

79

Factor 3, see Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87,1 10, 171 P.3d 442.
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additional fees to obtain protection against negligence. And, finally, the purchaser is left
wholly under the control of Sundance and its choice of horse, equipment and
direction/instructions.81 Particularly telling, the Equine Act itself supports the application
of this last factor by declaring that participants may still bring an action if the providers
do not choose a suitable mount or properly prepare and apply the riding gear.
Family friendly activities also justify a more restricted approach to immunizing
against liability than high risk, extreme sports activities. The case currently at bar, unlike
Berry or Pearce, involves a much milder activity. Berry considered a competitive, elbow
to elbow race between competitive skiers who were all vying to reach the finish line first.
Pearce addressed the somewhat obvious, but thrilling, risks associated with bobsledding
on an Olympic class facility. Here, Sundance provides the opportunity to "catch a view of
beautiful Stewart falls, listen to the sounds of nature, and enjoy your cowboy guide as
he/she leads you on a trail ride with your trusty mountain horse."

Further, Sundance

offered this experience with the caveat that their "trails are walking only" and the
opportunity for a "Chuck Wagon Dinner" following horseback rides. The recreational
activity at issue can hardly be said to be of the same quality in terms of the experience,
the dangers expected or the thrill sought out as the activities in either Pearce or Berry.

Factor 5, see id.
Factor 6, see id.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-202 (3) and (2)(a)(iii) (West 2012).
See "Sundance Activities: Horseback Riding" (attached as "Addendum A").
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Although horseback riding is depicted as a leisurely activity at Sundance,
horseback riding accounts for a disproportionate share of emergency room injuries.
According to a 2008 report released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
horseback riding accounted for a greater percentage of traumatic brain injury to children
than ice skating, riding ATVs, sledding or bicycling.84 After reviewing available
statistical data, another study concluded that "Horseback riding is considered more
dangerous than motorcycle riding, skiing, automobile racing, football and rugby."85
A medical study done in 2006 revealed that "[e]ven though horse related activities
have fewer participants than other sports and recreation activities, horseback riding is the
eighth leading cause of emergency department treated, sports and recreation related
o/:

injuries among female participants." This same study concluded that "[hjorse related
injuries are a public health concern not just for riders but for anyone in close contact with
horses." Considering these statistics, and analyzing similar equine liability acts, it is not
surprising that other state courts invalidated exculpatory releases for negligence of the
owners of equine activities.

CDC Data & Statistics | Feature: Nonfatal Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBIs),
http://www.cdc.gov/datastatistics/2008/brainInjuries/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
85

Ten years of major equestrian injury: are we addressing functional outcomes?,
http://w^^w.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2653027/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
86

Medical Non-fatal horse related injuries treated in emergency departments in
the United States, 2001-2003, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2564310/
(last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
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New Mexico has also enacted an Equine Liability Act. New Mexico's statute is
strikingly similar to Utah's Equine Act. The New Mexico act first provides immunity for
injuries which occur as part of a horseback riding activity. But, the act goes on, as does
the Utah act, to retain liability for faulty equipment and failure to make a reasonable and
prudent effort to assure that the animal and participant were appropriate for the activity.
Unlike the Utah Equine Act, New Mexico does not expressly retain liability for plain
negligence. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court nonetheless struck down an
exculpatory clause under the Turikl analysis.
In Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., the court found the existence of the statute to
provide a sufficient basis upon which to invalidate exculpatory contract on the basis an
application of the Tunkl factors. The court first observed that the Equine Liability Act
"very clearly expresses a policy that equine operators should not be held liable for equine
on

behavior." The court went on to note, however, that the Act also contains a qualifier, as
does Utah statute, which retained liability for the acts or omissions of the operator which
OQ

constituted negligence. The defendant argued there, as does the defendant in the instant
case, the retention of negligence served only to "limit the definition of conduct for which
it cannot be held liable."90
87

N.M. St. § 42-13-4 (West 2012).

88

Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1110 (N.M. 2003)

89

Id.

90

Matllll.
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The court, however, stated that "the legislative intent goes further than that to
express a policy that equine operators should be accountable for their own negligence."91
"[T]he legislature used a manner of writing that evidences the intent that patrons of
[horse riding businesses] should be able to make claims against them for negligence, but
not for equine behavior." "Thus, the Act expresses in general terms a policy that
operators should be held liable for negligence, but not for events beyond their control."
Prior to invalidating the exculpatory contract, the court observed that the New Mexico
"Act would do little more than codify the common law as it exists if it were to only
provide that, absent a release, operators may be held liable for their negligence but not for
injuries caused by equine behavior that is not the operators'fault" 94
Because of the legislation, the court found that the first Tunkl factor had been met.
Additionally, the court found all but two of the Tunkl factors to weigh against
enforcement of the exculpatory contract. The court found that the horse riding business
was opened to the public, did not offer a way for participants to expand their protection
by purchasing additional coverage, and please participants within the control of an
subject to the risk of carelessness by the businesses employees.95

91

id.

92

id.

92

id.

94

M a t 1112.

95

Id. at 1112-13.
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Similarly, the Connecticut courts struck down an exculpatory clause in a
recreational horseback riding case. In Connecticut, the act immunized 'inherent risks, but
retained liability if "the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of the person
providing the horse or horses."96 In striking down the exculpatory provision, the court
observed "that the legislature has stopped short of requiring participants to bear the very
risk that the defendants now seek to pass on to the plaintiff by way of a mandatory
release."97 Thus, the "attempt contractually to extend the plaintiffs assumption of risk
one step beyond that identified by the legislature [] violates the public policy of the state
Oft

and, therefore, is invalid." Finally, the Connecticut court made one other,observation
which also applies to the case under consideration by this Court.
In sum, the legislature preserved negligence liability for a recreational activity
which is sold and marketed as family friendly. Other states considering similar legislative
acts also strike down exculpatory contracts based on a Tunkl analysis. The contract at
issue here should, similarly, be invalidated because it offends our legislature's express
retention of negligence for seemingly benign, but statistically hazardous, activity.

96

Connecticut Statute § 52-557p (West 2012).

97

Reardonv. Windswept Farm, LLC, 905 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Conn. 2006).
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CONCLUSION
Allowing for-profit business to shift the costs associated with their irresponsible
conduct back upon society at large through a private exculpatory contract served no valid
societal interest. The public good served by tort law effects an appropriate distribution
back upon the wrongdoer far outweighs the ability privately contract to the detriment of
the public at large. Utah's constitution and historical case authority recognize a strong
public policy in favor of tort law.
Utah is a beautiful state with attractive wilderness and unparalleled recreational
opportunities. In order to promote public safety, and ensure that recreational activities
are conducted responsibly, the Court should enforce the public policy interests inherent in
the Utah State Constitution and the common tort law by ensuring public access to the
courts for the redress of grievances. This public policy interest is consistent with the
legislative objectives of the Equine Act, and will preserve the well-being of the public.
The Court should reverse the Utah Court of Appeals, and remand the instant action for
further proceedings.
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1.877.831.6224

Scenic Lift Rides
Hiking Trails
Mountain Biking
Fly Fishing
Horseback Riding
- Horse Trail Rides
River Rafting
Golfing

Current Weather

horseback riding
Located in one of the most beautiful mountain ranges in the world, the
stables are the perfect place to experience horseback riding at it's finest.
Enjoy breathtaking scenery as you traverse through pristine mountain
terrain. Catch a view of the beautiful Stewart Falls, listen to the sounds of
nature, and enjoy your cowboy guide as he/she leads you on a trail ride
with your trusty mountain horse.
Here at the stables we know the value in your experiences and memories.
We want them to remain personal to you and your party. All rides are
private or no more than 6 people per ride. We don't believe in long lines
and boring nose to tail rides. Our stables have one of the best trail systems
in the world. You will be captivated by the mountain surroundings and
scenery. All rides are conducted by Boulder Mountain Ranch, our preferred
horseback riding outfitter.
General Information
• Reservations are required. All rides must be scheduled at: least 24 hours
in advance. Contact our Concierge to make a reservation.
• All rides are western style and include a short instructional arena lesson
before trip begins.
• Children must be at least 8 years or older to participate on a trail ride.
Children under the age of 18 must be accompanied by an adult.
• One rider per horse—absolutely no double riding.
• Our trails are walking only.
• There is no weight limit. However, riders must be physically able to
mount their horse unassisted.
• Group discounts are available (50% deposit required for all groups larger
than 15 and/or any private function or activity).
• Maximum group size is 20 guests with one guide per six guests.
• Groups of 6 or more are automatically charged an 18% gratuity.
• Ride times are approximate due to different variables theit can come up
on each ride.
• Please arrive 20 minutes prior to scheduled ride.
Chuck Wagon Dinner
• We offer a wonderful Chuck Wagon dinner every Saturday at 4:30 pm.
Includes wagon ride to Elk Meadows for Cowboy Dinner (menu varies
occationally, call for more details). Groups of 12 or more can be
scheduled any day of the week. Must make a reservation 24 hours in
advance.
Cancellation Policy
• Cancellations inside of 24 hours will be charged in full
• Group reservations for 7 or more people require a 72 hour cancellation
notice.
Times and pricing subject to change at any time without notice.

Contact Us | Directions | Site Map | Privacy Policy
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We outfit and guide
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